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Greater Protection: Missouri Says No to Possible Asbestos
Contamination due to NESHAP and Possible RCRA Violations
Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing and Safety v. City of St. Louis,
Missouri
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants for
asbestos (hereinafter "NESHAP") was issued in 1973.2 The NESHAP
prescribes work practices for demolition and renovation of buildings
found to contain asbestos.3  Although there is an exception to the
NESHAP for single-family residences with four or fewer dwelling units,
no court had yet interpreted whether a group of single-family residences
under the same control or ownership fell under this exception.4 Although
the EPA has long answered that question in the negative, agreement from
this court makes this case no less important with both environmental and
developmental impacts.
In addition, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (hereinafter "RCRA") in 1976 to deal with expanding
consumer and industrial waste. Due to Congress' frustration with various
"loopholes" in RCRA regulations, in 1984, Congress added the ability for
citizens to bring suits for "solid hazardous waste that may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 6
While imminent and substantial endangerment has consistently been
construed liberally, the holding in this case, allowing a showing of
1 No. 4:05-CV-719, 2008 WL 4279569 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
2 R Robert M. Howard et al., The EPA's Prosecution of Clean Air Act Asbestos NESHAP
Cases Based Upon Nonbinding Bulk Material Test Methods, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 173,
192 (2007) (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos,
Beryllium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8,826, 8,829-30 (Apr. 6, 1973)).
340 C.F.R. § 61.145 (2008).
4 Id. § §61.141, 61.145.
5 Christopher Rizzo, RCRA's "Imminent and Substantial Endangerment" Citizens Suit
Turns 25, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2008, at 50 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (2006)).
6 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 19 (1983)).
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imminent and substantial endangerment if possible contamination may
pose a potential future harm, expands that liberal reading further and
deserves close attention by all developers and those involved in hazardous
waste.
The issues in this case arose from the 1999 expansion project at
Lambert St. Louis International Airport where ninety-nine buildings that
contained asbestos were demolished.7 This note will explore the court's
holding and analysis, analyze the court's interpretation of whether a group
of single-family residences with the same owner or operator falls under
the NESHAP, discuss the expansion of the liberal interpretation of the
RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment test, and comment on the
potential environmental and developmental affects of this holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The 1999 expansion project at Lambert St. Louis International
Airport required the demolition of approximately 1,900 parcels of land,
some containing buildings contaminated with asbestos.8  The pre-
demolition process called for a licensed asbestos inspector to take samples
and create an inspection form describing the location and amount of
asbestos-containing materials in each building.9 Asbestos abatement was
then performed, and the demolition contractor sent the County Health
Department (hereinafter "CHD") a letter listing the remaining material left
in the buildings that contained asbestos. 10 After review of the remaining
materials, the CHD would either approve or deny the use of a wet
demolition process."
7 Familiesfor Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at * 1, 19.
Id. at * 1. The EPA delegated its NESHAP authority to the State of Missouri which
delegated its authority to the Department of Natural Resources which delegated its
authority to the St. Louis County Health Department. Id.
9 Id. at *5. The airport environmental director reviewed the two forms and the lab results,
which was then used to create inventory reports Id.
10 Id
1 Id. Wet demolition allowed "water sprays as a 'primary means of emission control'. . .
'for reasons of safety, cost, and/or time."' Id. at *2. "The demolition procedures varied
depending on the amount of asbestos-containing material present or assumed to be
present in the structure." Id.
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A letter dated November 13, 2002, written by the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (hereinafter "MDNR") to the EPA,
asked if it was acceptable to remove regulated asbestos containing
material (hereinafter "RACM") by removing the entire structure under wet
conditions.12 In an initial letter, the EPA responded that the scenario
described would meet the intent of the regulations.' 3  Thirty-five
structures were then demolished using the wet method.14 However, more
than two months later, the EPA sent a second letter stating that wet
demolition on a case-by-case determination, as described in the EPA's
first letter, was counter to the NESHAP.15
Wet demolitions then ceased, and both the EPA and airport
executives negotiated procedures to continue the project, ultimately
signing an Administrative Order on Consent (hereinafter "AOC").16 The
AOC provided that the EPA authorized Defendants, the City of St. Louis
and the City of St. Louis Airport Authority (hereinafter "City Authority")
to utilize the same basic methods used under the County Guidelines. 17
After the AOC, sixty-four more residential structures were demolished
using the wet method.' 8
On June 11, 2004, the EPA issued a Desk Statement stating that no
wet demolitions were to be done while the EPA investifated recent
concerns raised about the method used by City Authority. Plaintiff,
Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing, and Safety (hereinafter
"FACTS"), filed suit alleging violations of the RCRA and seeking partial
12 Id. This was subject to the City Authority disposing the waste according to 40 C.F.R. §
61.150 and § 61.154. Id. 40 C.F.R. § 61.150 proscribes regulations for the packaging of
demolition debris and 40 C.F.R. § 61.154 covers the disposal of asbestos containing
waste. See id.
13 Id. The letter was dated November 17, 2002. Id.
14 Id. at *21.
1s Id. at *3. The counter-letter was dated January 22, 2003. Id.
16 Id. The AOC became effective on May 1, 2003. Id.
" See id. at *3, 13. This included permitting the wet demolition method without first
removing wall systems or ceilings containing asbestos, and to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether demolition of specific residential buildings without first removing
RACM was acceptable. Id. at *3.
8 Id. at *4. The AOC remained in effect until March 31, 2004. Id.
9 Id. Between then and this suit, no wet demolitions have occurred. Id.
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summary judgment arguing that City Authority failed to comply with the
NESHAP when City Authority demolished buildings containing asbestos,
exposing nearby residents to dangerous levels of asbestos. 20  city
Authority argued that single-family residences do not fall within the
regulations of the NESHAP and that, in the alternative, the method was
within NESHAP regulations. 2 1  City Authority motioned for summary
judgment on FACTS' RCRA claim arguing that FACTS had not shown
that the demolition caused imminent and substantial endangerment. 2 2
The court granted FACTS' motion for partial summary judgment
holding that single-family residences with the same owner or operator are
not exempt from the NESHAP, that City Authority's wet demolition
procedures did not meet the standards of the NESHAP, and that the AOC
was not an alternative work method because it had not been properly
issued since there was no notice or comment and no finding that the
method was equivalent to NESHAP requirements.23 Further, the court
denied City Authority's motion for summary judgment holding that
FACTS presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
demolition process created an imminent endangerment to public health
because FACTS showed that a potential contamination may pose a future
risk, which was all that was needed to demonstrate an imminent
endangerment. 24
201d at *1
21 Id. at *6. City Authority also argued that their good-faith reliance on the County and
EPA's procedures exempts it from liability. Id.
22 Id. at *1, 28.
23 Id. at *3 1.
24 Id. at *30. The three elements of the RCRA are "that the defendant is a person,
including, but not limited to, one who was or is a generator or transporter of solid waste
or hazardous waste ... ; 2) that the defendant contributed to or is contributing to the
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of solid or hazardous waste; and
3) that the solid or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment." Id. at *28 (quoting Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014-15 (11th Cir. 2004)). Only the third element is of




A. NESHAP and Single-Family Residences
The NESHAP was enacted in 1973 and remained unchanged until
1990, when the method for measuring asbestos content was amended.25
There have been no changes since 1990, although some non-binding
clarifications have been released.26 No published case has interpreted
single-family residence coverage under the NESHAP.
The EPA, however, has consistently stated that a group of
residences that are demolished or renovated and owned or under the
control of the same owner is subject to the NESHAP. The NESHAP
applies to facilities and specifies procedures for handling asbestos
containing material.27  "Facility" is defined as "any institutional,
commercial, public, industrial, or residential structure, installation, or
building (including any structure, installation, or building containing
condominiums . . . , but excluding residential buildings having four or
fewer dwelling units)."28 However, the NESHAP defines an installation
as "any building or structure or any group of buildings or structures ...
that are under the control of the same owner or operator."29
The 1990 NESHAP revision clearly stated that a project which
required the demolition or renovation of single-family residences with the
same owner or operator fell within NESHAP regulations. 30 The public
sent numerous comments for proposed revisions which the EPA then
25 Robert M. Howard et al., supra note 2, at 192-93. The 1990 method mandates a multi-
step analysis of all layers of the asbestos containing material to generate an average
percentage result for the material as a whole to determine if the material is friable or non-
friable. Id. at 181-82.
26 See id. at 174-75.
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a) (2008).
28 40 C.F.R. § 61.141.
29 id.
30 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990). Among other things, the 1990 Revision
sought to clarify which single family residences were covered under regulations. See id.
at 48,412.
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responded to and incorporated into the 1990 NESHAP revision. 31 Public
comments requested that the exclusion of residential facilities having four
or fewer dwelling units be eliminated.32 The EPA responded that it "does
not consider residential structures that are demolished or renovated as part
of a commercial or public project to be exempt from this rule." 33 The
EPA further clarified that a group of residential buildings under the
control of the same owner or operator is considered an installation
according to the definition in 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 and is covered by
NESHAP regulations. 34
In 1995, the EPA issued a notice of clarification that once again,
among other things, addressed whether single-family residences were
covered under the NESHAP.35 Although the notice of clarification was
not binding, 36 the EPA reiterated that the demolition of multiple small
residential buildings on the same site by the same owner or operator is
covered by the NESHAP.37 The clarification explained that the definition
of "facility" excluding "residential buildings having four or fewer
dwelling units" purposefully leaves out installations and therefore the
statutory language on its face includes the demolition of single-family
residences at a single site under the control of the same owner or
operator.38
The EPA continues to receive similar questions, and, in 2008,
clarified for yet another city that single-family residences demolished on
the same site for a highway project falls within NESHAP requirements. 39
31 Id
32 id.
Id. The EPA gave an example stating that "the demolition of one or more houses as
part of an urban renewal project, a highway construction project, or a project to develop a
shopping mall, industrial facility, or other private development, would be subject to ." Id.
34id
3 Asbestos Clarification of Intent, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,725 (July 28, 1995).
36 Robert M. Howard et al., supra note 2, at 186, 206 (stating that EPA's clarification was
not subjected to a public comment period).
3 Asbestos NESHAP Clarification of Intent, 60 Fed. Reg. at 38,725. The clarification
clearly stated that this applied to municipalities. Id.
38 Id at 38,726 (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Asbestos NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. at 48,415).
39 EPA Interpretations ofNSPS, NESHAP, and MACT Requirements, 18 AIR POLLUTION
CONSULTANT, March 2008, at 2.39. Jefferson City Missouri asked whether single-family
735
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B. Interpretation ofImminent and Substantial under the RCRA
Congress enacted the RCRA in 1976 to deal with the expanding
consumer and industrial waste in the United States.40 Congress had high
hopes that this provision would create a way for citizens to address
dangerous disposal activities that the EPA or states were unwilling or
unable to address.4 1 It was not until 1984 that Congress enacted the third
category of citizen suit, at issue in this note, which allows citizens to bring
suit "against any person for the past or present generation, transport,
treatment, storage, or disposal of a solid hazardous waste that 'may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment."'42 Congress enacted this new section due to its frustration
with various "loopholes" in RCRA regulations and the slow pace of the
EPA and state enforcement actions. 4 3 Over the last few years, the use of
the RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment citizen suit provision
has expanded.44 However, the RCRA left imminent and substantial
endangerment undefined by statute, leaving courts to create a workable
definition.45
residences are subject to the asbestos NESHAP if the residences are being demolished as
part of a highway expansion, which, of course, the EPA answered in the affirmative. Id.
40 Rizzo, supra note 5, at 50.
41 Id. To prevail under an RCRA claim, a plaintiff must show that "1) the defendant is a
person, including but not limited to, one who was or is a generator or transporter of solid
or hazardous waste or one who was or is an owner or operator of a solid of hazardous
waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility; 2) that the defendant has contributed to or is
contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid or
hazardous waste; and 3) that the solid or hazardous waste may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)
(2006). Only the third element is of concern in this note.
42 Rizzo, supra note 5, at 50 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)). Citizens can also bring
suit under § 6972(a)(1)(A) for violation of a permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition, or order of RCRA. Citizens can also bring suit against EPA for
failure to perform its nondiscretionary RCRA duties under § 6972(a)(2). Id.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 51. RCRA citizen suits show an increase from about eight in 1987 to about
twenty to twenty-five each year from 2000 to 2007 with citizen suits reaching a peak in
1995 with about twenty-five reported cases. Id.
45 Raymond K. Hoxsie Real Estate Trust v. Exxon Educ. Found., 81 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365
(D.R.I. 2000).
736
Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev., Vol. 16, No. 3
Despite the lack of a statutory definition, courts' interpretations of
imminent and substantial endangerment have been relatively consistent,
with a growing trend to ease the burden on plaintiffs to present a
cognizable case. As early as 1989, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp, stated that the purpose of the RCRA
provision is to "give broad authority to the courts to grant all relief
necessary to ensure complete protection of the public health and the
environment." 46  In 1991, in Dague v. City of Burlington, the Second
Circuit echoed by stating that the RCRA is designed not only to prevent
but also mitigate endangerments to the public health and environment, and
therefore the statute is "basically a prospective act designed to prevent
improper disposal of hazardous wastes in the future." 47
Some courts have attempted to use a stricter standard for whether
an activity poses an imminent and substantial endangerment. For
example, the District Court of New Jersey, in Interfaith Community
Organization v. Honeywell International, Inc., held that an imminent and
substantial endangerment may be found where "1) there is a potential
population at risk; 2) the contamination at issue is a RCRA 'solid' or
'hazardous waste'; 3) the contamination is present at levels above which is
considered acceptable by the state; and 4) there is a pathway for current
and/or future exposure." 48 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit found
this to be too high of a standard, holding that a living population need not
be endangered as long as the environment is endangered.49 Instead, the
court stated that
[P]laintiffs need only demonstrate that the waste..."may
present" an imminent and substantial threat... Similarly,
the term "endangerment" means a threatened or potential
46 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989).
47 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (citing STAFF
OF H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATION, COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 32 (Comm. Print 1979) ("the
Eckhardt Report")).
48 263 F. Supp. 2d 796, 838 (D.N.J. 2003).
4' 399 F.3d 248, 259-60 (3d. Cir. 2005). The court nevertheless affirmed that an
imminent and substantial endangerment exists since the contamination levels at the site
and surrounding area ranged from 200 to 8,000 times over the state standards. Id. at 261.
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harm, and does not require proof of actual harm... .The
endangerment must also be "imminent" [meaning]
threatens to occur immediately.. .Because the operative
word is "may," however, the plaintiffs must [only] show
that there is a potential for an imminent threat of serious
harm... [as] an endangerment is substantial if it is
"serious"...to the environment or health.5 o
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Co., a Western District of Missouri case, the court highlighted situations in
which an endangerment may be regarded as substantial, "such as exposure
to carcinogenic agents or other hazardous contaminants . . . ."5' The court
held that an imminent and substantial endangerment existed because "[t]he
quantities of dioxin and other compounds found at the defendant's farm
were highly toxic at low dosage levels and given the conditions of the soil
and bedrock beneath the site, there was a substantial likelihood of human
and environmental exposure." 52
The Ninth Circuit, in Price v. United States Navy, in 1994,
adopted the rule that endangerment means a threatened or potential harm
and that imminence refers "to the nature of the threat rather than
identification of the time when the endangerment initially arose."5 3
Therefore, according to the court, the burden is met as long as plaintiff can
prove a present threat, even if the impact may not be felt for years.5 4 The
court held, however, that plaintiff failed to show the requisite imminent
and substantial endangerment where contamination of soil had occurred in
5 0 Id. at 258 (quoting Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir.
2004)); see also United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir.1982) (concluding §
6972(a)(1)(B) contains "expansive language" conferring "upon the courts the authority to
grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by
toxic wastes") (emphasis added).579 F. Supp. 823, 846 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).52 d
s 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. v. Price, 688 F.2d at 213); see also
Enthyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
54 Price, 39 F.3d at 1019.
738
Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev., Vol. 16, No. 3
the area of plaintiffs property but plaintiffs house sat on a concrete slab,
which protected the house from any soil contamination.
In 1999, the Eighth Circuit, in Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., citing
the standard in both Price and Aceto Agriculture Chemical Corp., held
that where the lower courts found that petroleum constituents were located
many feet below the ground only in low concentrations, even though
residents did not use the underground water for drinking purposes, these
facts were enough to hold that the lower court's finding of an imminent
and substantial harm was not clearly erroneous.56
The District Court of Maryland held in Two Rivers Terminal, L.P.,
v Chevron USA, Inc., in 2000, that contamination or just pollution alone
does not trigger the RCRA "imminent and substantial endangerment"
provision.57
As recent as 2007, in Maine People's Alliance and National
Resource Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., the First Circuit
continued its trend to interpret the RCRA broadly.5 8  With a renewed
focus on the word "may," the court concluded that "a reasonable prospect
of future harm is adequate to engage the gears of RCRA § 7002(a)(B)(1)
as long as the threat is near-term and involves potentially serious harm." 59
The court found an imminent and substantial endangerment where the
EPA was already cleaning up of a river that had been contaminated with
mercury-containing waste.6 0 K- 7 Enterprise, L.P. v. Jester also highlights
the broad reading of this RCRA standard, where the Eastern District of
Texas found that contamination from leaking underground storage tanks
occurring over three decades, without substantial change over the last ten
years, posed an imminent and substantial endangerment.6 '
Clearly, courts have appeared to read the power granted by the
RCRA as a broad mandate to protect the environment and public health
from hazardous materials.
s Id. at 1020.
56 200 F.3d 1140, 1150-52 (8th Cir. 1999).
* 96 F. Supp. 2d 432,446 (M.D. Penn. 2000).
5 471 F.3d 277, 296 (1st Cir. 2007).
5 Id.
60 Id. at 296.




A. Single-Family Residences Owned by City Authority are governed by
the NESHAP
The court first held that the single-family residences are governed
by the NESHAP.62 City argued that the plain language of the definition of
"facility" within the NESHAP exempts single-family residences. 63
FACTS relied on clarifications by the EPA indicating that the single-
family residences owned by City Authority fell under the NESHAP and
the plain language of the statute defining installation.64  Although City
Authority argued that these clarifications are invalid attempts at
rulemaking, the court held that the 1990 clarification was entitled to
controlling weight because it was developed after extensive commentary
from interested members of the public. 65 The court concluded that the
group of single-family residences demolished in the expansion project fell
within the regulations of the NESHAP.66
B. City Authority did not comply with the NESHAP
The court then considered whether the wet demolition procedures
used by City Authority were less stringent than NESHAP regulations.67
Due to City Authority's use of both the County Guidelines and then the
62 Families for Asbestos Compliance, Safety & Testing v. City of St. Louis, Mo., No.
4:05-CV-719, 2008 WL 4279569, at *31 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 15, 2008).
63 Id. at *8. In order to establish liability for NESHAP violations, FACTS must show that
the asbestos NESHAP applies to the City Authority and the contested demolitions did not
meet NESHAP requirements. Id. at *7.
6 Id. at *9. The 1990 revision clearly states that "a group of residential buildings under
the control of the same owner or operator is considered an installation" and is therefore
covered by the NESHAP for asbestos. Id. The 1995 clarification similarly supports
FACTS' argument. Id. at * 10.
65 Id. at *9. Although the court held that the 1995 clarification did not deserve
controlling weight since it had no public comment period before being developed, the
court still gave the clarification due respect since it was consistent with the controlling
1990 revision. Id. at *10.
66 Id.671d. at*11.
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AOC during the project, the court broke the analysis into two different
discussions. 68
First, the court examined the County Guidelines as compared to
NESHAP regulations. 69 The County Guidelines called for a case-by-case
determination for approval of wet asbestos and required compliance with
the St. Louis County Air Pollution Code.7 0 City Authority followed the
outdoor abatement section of the code which calls for the use of a water
solution containing an effective wetting agent during the removal
process.7 1
Proper NESHAP requirements and procedures vary depending on
whether the material is friable or non-friable asbestos.72 The NESHAP
requires friable RACM to be removed "before any activity begins that
would break up, dislodge, or similarly disturb the material," unless an
exception exists.73 City Authority argued that the material was not friable
and therefore it did not need to remove all the RACM before demolition. 74
68 See infra text accompanying notes 69-89. The court first considered the period
between October 1999 and May 2003 when wet demolitions were being conducted
pursuant to County guidelines. Id. at * 13. The second phase was between May 2003 and
mid-June 2004 where the City Authority conducted wet demolitions pursuant to the
AOC. Id. at *21.
69 Id. at *13.
'old. at* 13-14.
71 Id. at * 15 (quoting ST. LouIs COUNTY, Mo., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL CODE §
612.530-7.3.3 (2001)). The outdoor method applies to the removal of asbestos from
structural items in and accessible from outdoor areas. Id. (quoting § 612.530-7.3). The
code further states that compliance does not relieve the duty to comply with other
applicable state and federal laws and regulations. Id. at * 14 (quoting § 612.530-2.7).
72 Id. at * 15. However, the Code makes no distinction between friable and non-friable
asbestos but states that during removal all will be considered friable. Id at * 14 (quoting
§ 612.530-7.1.1). Friable is "any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos . . .
that, when dry, can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure." Id.
at *15 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2008)). Nonfriable asbestos is "any material
containing more than 1 percent asbestos . .. that, when dry, cannot be crumbled,
vulverized, or reduced to power using hand pressure." Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 61.141).
Id. at *16 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(1)). FACTS contended that the asbestos can
be removed only after demolition has begun unless the material was not discovered until
demolition began or the buildings are not structurally sound. Id. City Authority did not
argue for either of these exceptions. Id
74 See id. at *17-18.
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However, FACTS relied on inventory and inspection reports submitted to
the CHD by City Authority that identified certain material as friable. 75
Although City Authority had two experts testify that since the County
treated all material as friable during the removal process, the label friable
only meant "treated as friable," the court found this testimony
unconvincing. Due to that conclusion and the strict liability of the
NESHAP, the court held that City Authority failed to meet the
requirements of the NESHAP.
The court concluded that friable asbestos was left in ninety-nine
buildings that were demolished and, of those ninety-nine, thirty-five were
demolished using the above described method. Therefore, City Authority
was liable for thirty-five violations of the NESHAP.
The court next explored the requirements under the AOC to
determine if the remaining sixty-four demolished structures also violated
the NESHAP. 79 Since the AOC allowed basically the same procedure
used under the County Guidelines, the question was whether the AOC was
an "alternative work practice" authorized by the EPA.so
FACTS argued that the AOC was not an alternative work method
because the only available method to issue a binding alternate work
practice was through 40 C.F.R. § 61.12 and City Authority did not follow
81
the proper procedure. City Authority argued this was an alternative
work practice authorized by the EPA pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 61.12, §
61.149, § 61.15082 or the Clean Air Act. 83
7 1Id. at * 17.76 Id. at * 17-19. The court reasoned that the NESHAP did not have a category "treated as
friable" but rather that the material be clearly identified as friable or non-friable. Id at
*20.
77 id.
78 Id. at *21.
79 d
80 Id.
81 Id. at *23.
82 40 C.F.R. § 61.12 contains the general provisions that apply to the NESHAP for air
pollutants. Id. at *22. The court held that the AOC cannot be validly issued pursuant to
40 C.F.R. § 61.149 or § 61.150 because § 61.149 only applies to the disposal of asbestos-
laden waste the demolition generates and § 61.150 only specifies the proper method for
handling the resulting waste materials. Id. at *24.
8 Id. at *22-24.
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The court held that the AOC was not an alternative work practice
under the Clean Air Act. 84 Under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(3), the EPA may
provide an alternative work practice so long as the alternative is
"equivalent to the reduction in emissions achieved" under NESHAP
requirements. Reasoning that the NESHAP does not allow wet
demolition unless the building is unsound, the court concluded that the wet
demolition undertaken by City Authority could not be an equivalent work
method. 86 The court found that City Authority also did not comply with
40 C.F.R. § 61.12 since it requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, a
written application to be submitted, and to prove that the alternative
method is equivalent.8 7 City Authority offered no evidence that the EPA
provided a notice and comment period or that the method was
equivalent.8 8 Therefore, the court held that the AOC was invalid and City
Authority was liable for an additional sixty-four NESHAP violations for
the structures demolished pursuant to the invalid AOC.89
C. Summary Judgment Denied for FACTS' RCRA Claim
Finally, the court denied City Authority's motion for summary
judgment as to FACTS' claim that the waste disposed of during the
demolition project fell under the RCRA. 90 City Authority argued that
FACTS failed to show that its conduct created "an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or environment." 91 The court noted
that whether a substantial and imminent danger exists is a question of
84 Id. at *25. City Authority relied on 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(3). Id. at *24. An alternative
route is through § 7412(h)(1) where the EPA must promulgate numerical emission
limitations, which clearly did not occur in this case. Id at *25.
85 Id.
86 id.
" Id at *23-24.
18 Id. at *26. City Authority contended that over two hundred monitoring tests were
taken during the demolition project but the report relied on had no conclusions
confidently drawn concerning the effectiveness of the wetting process compared to the
NESHAP's regulations. Id. at *27.
89 Id. at *28.
90 Id. at *30.
' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2006)).
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fact.92 The court heavily relied on the EPA's statement that "[s]oil
contamination from either airborne or wetborne transport of fibers is
always a concern as this could serve as a reservoir for further activity-
related releases."93  The question, the court stated, was not whether
asbestos was released but rather whether possible asbestos contamination
may pose a potential future risk.94 The court held that FACTS showed
that City Authority's actions caused a potential contamination that could
pose a future risk and therefore denied summary judgment. 9
V. COMMENT
A. The NESHAP Includes a Group, offour or more, Single-Family
Residences with the same Owner or Operator
The language of the NESHAP concerning a group of single-family
residences can be confusing.9 6  The court correctly concluded that the
regulatory language is ambiguous since residential buildings with four or
fewer units are exempt, but a group of buildings or structures with the
same owner or operator within a single site are included. 97
With no case discussing this interpretation, the court relied solely
on the EPA's interpretation and the statutory language. 98 Considering that
the 1990 revision was passed after public notice and comment,99 it is
irrelevant whether the 1995 clarification is binding since both are
consistent. The 1990 revision to further clarify which single-family
92 Id. at *29.
9 See id. at *30.
94 d
9
' Id. at *31.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
9 See Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at *8.
98 See id. at *8-10. It is well established that courts give deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. See Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 608 U.S. 555, 556
(1980); Udal v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945); Pac. Coast Med. Enter. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 123,130-31 (9th
Cir. 1980).
9 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990).
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residences would be included under the NESHAP states, as an example,
that "several houses located in highway right-of-way that are all
demolished as part of the same highway project would be considered an
"installation," even if the houses are not proximate to each other."' 00 This
example is very similar to the 1999 St. Louis airport expansion project,
which makes it hard to argue that City Authority did not know that the
NESHAP applied to the ninety-nine residential buildings demolished
during the expansion project.
Moreover, it would be against the NESHAP's policy to exclude
around ninety-nine residential buildings containing asbestos. The
exemption that the NESHAP allows is supported by the rationale that
single-family residences, in general, contain only a small amount of
asbestos material and, therefore, do not need regulation.' 0' Clearly, the
EPA never envisioned that a group of ninety-nine residential buildings
would be exempt because the small amount of asbestos rationale would no
longer apply.
Despite the EPA's revision and clarifications, in 2008, before this
holding, the EPA addressed yet another question concerning whether a
group of residences with the same owner being demolished for a highway
project were included under the NESHAP.1 02
Anyone who is involved in any kind of demolition who chooses to
continue believing that the NESHAP will not apply to large projects just
because the buildings demolished are residential, will pay for such wishful
thinking. This holding could be used to argue that anytime a project larger
than four single-family residences is undertaken, a danger is present and
NESHAP regulations must be followed. This case should serve as a
warning to developers and those involved in hazardous waste to err on the
safe side and follow NESHAP requirements rather than risk punishment
and expensive fines for NESHAP violations. Hopefully, this will, in turn,
better protect the public's health and environment.
* Id. at 48,412.
'' Asbestos NESHAP Clarification of Intent 60 Fed. Reg. 38,725 (July 28, 1995).




B. City Authority Did Not Comply with the NESHAP
Since it is undisputed that RACM was left in buildings demolished
using the wet method, the main issue became identification of what kind
of asbestos was left. 03 Therefore, the issue was reduced to whether the
term "friable" on City Authority's inventory reports was conclusive
evidence that the material left in the buildings was actually friable.
The court rejected the argument that the term "friable" on the
inventory reports was merely complying with the County Guidelines and
did not mean friable as defined by the NESHAP.1 04 However, even if the
court accepted that "friable" meant "treated as friable," City Authority still
would not have complied with NESHAP requirements. Because the
NESHAP requires categorization of all RACM as friable or non-friable
before demolition and because the NESHAP does not recognize a category
labeled as "treated as friable," friable written on the NESHAP's inventory
reports by City Authority could only mean friable, as defined by the
NESHAP.'os Indeed, City Authority would be guilty of false reporting
under the NESHAP if the court found that the term "friable" on the
inventory reports did not mean friable as defined by the NESHAP.106
Moreover, regardless of which section that City Authority argued
that the AOC was a proper alternative work method, City Authority did
not follow the procedure of any of those sections.107 Under Clean Air Act,
City Authority would have had to show that the method resulted in an
103 NESHAP clearly states that only non-friable asbestos, and other exemptions that do
not exist in this case, must be removed before any activity that dislodges, breaks up, or
disturbs the material. 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a)(1), (c)(1) (2008).
104 Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 2008
WL 4279569, at *19 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
1os id.
106 40 C.F.R. § 61.05(d).
107 City Authority argued that this was an alternative work method authorized by the EPA
pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.12, 61.149, 61.150, or the Clean Air Act. Families for
Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at *22-23. Both 40 C.F.R.
§§ 61.149 and 61.150 were quickly dismissed because § 61.149 only applies to disposal
of asbestos-laden waste the demolition generates and § 61.150 only specifies the proper
method for handling the resulting waste materials. Id. at *23-24.
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"equivalent" amount of emission reduction. 08  City Authority did not
attempt to show this, probably due to the fact that the EPA and City
Authority started negotiations in the first place as a result of the EPA's
discovery that City Authority was using an ineffective method.109 City
Authority also did not meet the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 61.12 because
neither City Authority or the EPA issued notice, offered an opportunity for
those concerned to be heard, submitted a written application nor proved
that the alternative work method was equivalent." 0  Moreover, the
NESHAP is a strict liability statute which makes good faith reliance only
relevant concerning punishment not liability."' Therefore, it appears that
City Authority simply did not check the procedures for proper enactment
prior to hazardously relying on the agreement.
From filling out the inventory reports to wet demolishing buildings
still containing asbestos, City Authority violated the NESHAP procedures.
This case should serve as a warning and reminder for all to check local,
state, and federal procedures before and during a construction or
demolition project.
C. Liberal Interpretation of the RCRA's Imminent
and Substantial Endangerment Expanded
This holding appears to be a liberal reading of the RCRA since the
court expanded the already liberal reading of the imminent and substantial
endangerment requirement. The extreme cases relied on by City
Authority show that its actions probably did not impose an imminent and
substantial endangerment since FACTS failed to show any present soil
contamination. 11 Cases where the endangerment is not so extreme
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(3) (2006).
109 Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at * 3.
0 Id. at *26. City Authority contended that over two hundred monitoring tests were
taken during the demolition project, but the report relied on had no conclusions
confidently drawn concerning the effectiveness of the wetting process compared to
NESHAP's regulations. Id at *27.
" Id. at *6.
112 It seems clear that when a landfill is currently leaking hazardous chemicals into the
soil, groundwater, and surface waters of a wetland, an imminent and substantial
endangerment exists as was the case in Dague v. City ofBurlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356
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demonstrate that courts were looking for a present threat in order to
conclude that an imminent and substantial endangerment exists. In 1984,
a Missouri District Court found an imminent and substantial
endangerment where, although the dioxin concentration levels were low,
the contamination was highly toxic at low doses." 3 Also in Missouri, in
1999, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that an imminent and substantial
endangerment existed where the petroleum contamination at issue was
located many feet below the ground, existed only in low concentrations,
and where the residents did not use that water for drinking.1 4 However,
the Ninth Circuit refused to find an imminent and substantial
endangerment where the state had already ordered asbestos cleanup and
the plaintiffs' house sat on a concrete slab protecting the house from soil
exposure." 5
The cases above demonstrate that courts closely examine the type
of contamination and the threat the contamination poses considering facts
specific to each circumstance. In its holding, the court in the instant
decision relied on the fact that the EPA claimed that soil contamination is
always a concern and that failure to remove asbestos before demolition
could cause soil contamination and pose a risk to the public's health.116
However, FACTS showed no evidence of any contamination. Further, the
court dismissed City Authority's expert testimony explaining that the type
of asbestos remaining in the residences was short fiber chrysolite to which
short-term exposure by nearby residents would not pose a substantial
(2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). More obvious, is where
contamination levels of soil were thirty times higher than the state standard, and
contamination in the ground water ranged from 200 to 8,000 times higher than acceptable
as was the case in Interfaith Community Organization v. Honeywell International, Inc.,
399 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
113 United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
114 Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1999).
115 Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejects Price's
argument that the concrete slab is cracking and that she would have to disturb the soil to
replace the slab which could cause migration of the contaminants because no evidence
indicated contamination existed beneath Price's house and Price failed to show that she
needed to move the concrete slab. Id. at 1018, 1021.
"
6 Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at *30.
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danger because the NESHAP is a strict liability statute. However, the
court fails to explain why this argument lacks relevance for the imminent
and substantial endangerment analysis." 7
Comparing the cases above with the instant case demonstrates that
this particular case is an extension of the RCRA's imminent and
substantial endangerment standard. City Authority's actions seem to
present less of a risk than in Price where the court found a lack of a
present threat due to the cracking concrete slab protecting Price's
property." 8 This case seems more like Petrovic, where the court found
only low contamination existedll 9 and can be easily distinguished from
the cases where contamination soared 20 or low doses of the
contamination were highly toxic. 12 1 The instant court is creating an easier
standard by stating the question is not whether contamination or asbestos
leaking occurred, but, rather, whether possible contamination may pose a
potential future risk.122 By using the words "possible contamination,"
"may," and "potential future risk," the instant court makes a standard
under which many more situations could now pose an imminent and
substantial endangerment.
Although a liberal reading of the RCRA already existed, this
holding presents a rule where it is hard to imagine situations that would
not meet its requirement. The instant court seems to be allowing FACTS
to escape summary judgment merely on the showing of any possible
environmental or health risk. The court may be indicating that the
frustration of hazardous waste dangers are not being resolved even with
the passage of this section of the RCRA; or, the court may merely be
taking the RCRA's mission to heart by allowing almost any RCRA
environmental or health claim to survive summary judgment. Regardless
of the reason why, this holding will please environmentalists and better
protect Missouri's environment and public health. Hopefully, this
7 Id. at *20. One easy response is the fact that City Authority's brief only discussed the
length of the fiber in the NESHAP count.
118 See supra text accompanying note 115.
119 See supra text accompanying note 114.
120 See supra note 112.
121 See supra text accompanying note 113.
122 See Families for Asbestos Compliance, Testing & Safety, 2008 WL 4279569, at *30.
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decision will compel developers and those involved in hazardous waste to
watch their actions closely.
VI. CONCLUSION
This case should end all questions concerning whether a project
demolishing more than four single-family residences with the same owner
or operator falls within the NESHAP requirements. This case may also
serve as an official judicial recognition that the NESHAP is a broad strict
liability statute, which courts will apply narrowly in efforts to best protect
the environment and public health against hazardous waste. Since this is
the first case interpreting the single-family residence coverage in the
NESHAP, it remains to be seen how much impact this holding will truly
have. However, it is not far-fetched to conclude that this holding may
result in developers and those involved in hazardous waste to err on the
side of caution and follow NESHAP regulations protecting the public
health and environment rather than risk a finding that the project fell
within the NESHAP and face violations.
Further, Missouri is not only opening the door but rather taking the
door off the hinges for plaintiffs to successfully plead a RCRA imminent
and substantial endangerment claim. It is unclear whether this new test
will be followed by other courts, or even upheld on appeal, but what is
certain, is that plaintiffs looking to defeat a summary judgment motion, for
now in Missouri, must only show that a possible contamination may pose
a potential future risk. With this definition, it is hard to imagine any
scenario where any defendant will win a summary judgment motion. It
appears that the court is continuing to see the ability for a plaintiff to sue
for hazardous waste that may result in contamination that may pose any
risk to the environment or public health as one of vital importance.
ERIN P. SEELE
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